Counterrevolution: The Military
Okay, we have dealt with the problem of the media but we have not dealt with the problem of the military. Could we not foresee the possibility of the military stepping in and squashing the counterrevolution? What if, upon seeing the deep state removed and the media being taken over, the generals decide that the counterrevolutionaries have gone too far? This was a concern of Lord Mountbatten, who turned down a plot to install him as autocrat of the United Kingdom on account of a media and military who would not support his rule.
For the military to get involved, it would have to believe that the old regime would be better for them than the new regime. What would make one regime preferable to the other? Pay and prestige. “These troops may, from the first, assume a lively attitude; but that very they will want to eat, and will being to detach themselves from the power that no longer pays them.”1 If the previous regime is bankrupted, as discussed here and here, and if the new regime either promises, or has delivered on, significant pay raises and new equipment, then the military is less likely to interfere in the regime change. Faced with two clients, one that cannot provide pay and one that can, one that cannot keep aircraft and ships in shape, and one that can, one that has recently suffered losses in the Middle East, Hong Kong, and, now, potentially in Ukraine, and one that has a new vision for the future, the military would not be keen on preventing regime change.
Besides incentivizing the military with funds, equipment, and potential future prestige, it is entirely possible to target officers in-training with content to sway their opinion on counterrevolution. Take those who are actively opposed to counterrevolution, those who would act to stop it, and turn them into people who are passively opposed, namely, those who would prefer the current regime to the counterrevolution but would not actively work against a counterrevolution. Those who are indifferent, make them passive supporters and make the passive supporters active supporters. To do this a list of registered students at West Point could easily be obtained, and from there the top 5% of students could then be targeted for content blasts.
The question is whether or not incentives and targeted content can prevent the military from stepping in and saving the regime. I, unfortunately, do not know. If I am being honest, I have very little knowledge of the military…let alone the officer class. My family has a slight military history, and I know a handful of army veterans, but it is not enough to ascertain whether or not the above is enough to dissuade the military from intervening on behalf the regime. Incentives and shifting the upcoming officer class away from active opposition to, at least, passive opposition if not towards support, should do the trick on paper. Any analysis beyond this has to come from someone besides me.
Joseph de Maistre, Translated by Edward Maxell III. Major Works Vol. I. Imperium Press 2021. Pg 121