I. The Thomistic Explication
Post-modernity is marked, in part, by the collapse of “given-ness.” By given-ness, we mean not only the possibility, but the plausibility, to assume that one’s tradition is synonymous with reality. In the Eastern Roman Empire, to give a religious example, Orthodoxy was given, or, in other words, it was justifiable to assume that the teachings of Orthodoxy accurately described reality, and it was equally justifiable to dismiss the heterodox in the same way that one dismisses a man who thinks a rock thrown in the air will not fall back to the ground. A more cultural example would be 17th century America. Though the Federalists and Anti-Federalists had serious disagreements, there existed a common, assumed, tradition which both parties took as given. Montesquieu was cited in the great debate because he was an authority, it was assumed that he would be taken seriously, and that his voice carried a degree of weight which must be respected. It would have been inconceivable for either Publius or Cato to dismiss Montesquieu wholesale, or to argue from Confucius.
What made given-ness a possibility in pre-modernity, and then in modernity, was a certain conception of truth, a conception where you can “just see” the truth. For most of the history of the West, which we shall henceforth designate as all those lands which sided with Rome in the Great Schism of 1054, truth was thought in terms of correspondence. Beginning with Plato, and culminating in Thomas Aquinas’ articulation, the correspondence theory of truth is the most familiar theory to English readers. Thomas, in his Summa Theologica, gives a simple, and succinct, account,
“I answer that, As was stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true according as it has the likeness of the thing known, which is its form as a knowing power. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way does sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which it itself is apprehending concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is. When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about the thing, then it first knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from, the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate. This clearly shows that the sense is true in regard to a given thing, as is also the intellect, in knowing what a thing is; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is, in like manner, the case with propositions or terms. Truth, therefore, may be in the sense, or in the intellect knowing what a thing is, as in something that is true; yet not as a thing is known in the knower, which is implied by the word truth; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the sense, nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is.”1
Looking at a desk, I can see that it is made of wood. In my head is the idea, or form, of a desk made of wood, and since this idea corresponds to what is physically in front of me, then I have possession of the truth. Furthermore, the idea “there is a desk in front of me which is made of wood” is a proposition, and as such, what is being measured against the “thing itself”, the actual desk, is language. Truth, then, is intellectual, as it resides in the intellect, and linguistic, since the idea in the intellect is propositional. With truth, on the correspondence theory, being both intellectual and linguistic, it is universal, accessible to all, and independent from anyone’s personal experience. Personal experience may help contextualize, or confirm, a truth, but it is not strictly necessary. That the moon is spherical is true, regardless if I observe the moon or not. A blind woman who has the proposition “the moon is spherical” in her head has the truth, because that idea corresponds to the physical moon, there is, to use Thomas’ language, “conformity of intellect and thing.” Likewise, the proposition “all geese are birds” is true apart from any lived experience with geese, and can be known by dividing the class “bird” into a number of genera, which includes the genus “goose”, which I may come to know about from another’s account. No personal interaction with geese, or even birds, is necessary for me to have the idea “all geese are birds” in my head, and for this idea to correspond to the biological reality. Such a proposition could be held by someone who lives in such a climate that is prohibitive for geese, any while the holder of this proposition may be personally deprived of some experiential knowledge of geese, the truth of the proposition remains unaffected.
Quoting from The Summa, may give the impression that the correspondence theory rests upon a theological, or Aristotelian, foundation, and must have took a hit in modernity. It is in modernity, however, that the correspondence theory found its true home. Truth being intellectual and linguistic (on the correspondence theory), and thus universal, and independent of personal experience, ascertaining truth through a particular religion runs contrary to the universality of truth. Prior to Question 16, Article 2, Thomas says the following,
“I answer that, Two things are required for both sensible and for intellectual vision—viz., power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the likeness of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual, whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the source of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would possess both the visual power, and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.
Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual power and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellectual power of the creatures is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him Who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some superadded perfection of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there is needed some likeness of God on the part of the visual power, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the thing seen, which must in some way be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen through any created likeness. First, because as Dionysius says, by the likeness of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known, as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen through any created species whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His very being, as was shown above, which cannot be said of any created form. Hence, no created form can be the likeness representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself supereminently whatever can be signified or understood by a created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created species, for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence, to say that God is seen through some likeness is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God there is required some likeness in the visual power, namely the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Psalm (xxxv. 10) In Thy light we shall see light. The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created likeness representing the divine essence as it is in itself.”2
Thomas is here outlining the necessity for sanctifying grace (some superadded perfection of grace or of glory) so that the essence of God may be seen by the intellect. Vision, Thomas tells us, requires “the power of sight, and union of the thing with the sight.” In the case of “corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness”, as with physical vision where the essence of the thing seen is not found in the eye (the very table in front of me is not actually in my eye), but only the refracted light. Should there be no likeness of a thing seen to which my eye can have union, if an object does not refract a light perceptible to my eye, vision becomes impossible. That we our vision is only confided to a segment of the light spectrum, outside of which our eyes are unable to register, proves the necessity of the likeness of a thing. In the case of intellectual vision, whose power “God is the author”, Man does not possess a likeness of His essence in the way that Man’s eyes possess a likeness of corporeal objects, nor, because of the radical dissimilarity between Creator and created, can God “be seen through any created likeness”, and thus requires “some kind of participated likeness of Him.” This “created likeness is the grace of God, by which we are able to see God’s essence, for “In Thy light we shall see light.”
Elsewhere, Thomas specifies how this kind of grace is different from other kinds,
“I answer that, As the Apostle says (Romans 13:1), "those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulgate: 'those that are, are ordained by God]." Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others.
And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called "gratuitous grace," since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 12:7): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of others.”3
Truth, being propositional, and thus linguistic, is universal, and independent from experience. Correspondence, in the case of learning the truth about God, requires sanctifying grace, for it is by God’s sanctifying grace that the intellect has some created likeness of God. To receive sanctifying grace, the sacramental life is necessary, as Thomas tells us,
“I answer that, We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. For it is evident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of Baptism (Galatians 3:27): "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ." And man is made a member of Christ through grace alone.
Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king's command, a hundred pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord's Supper: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred." But if we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king's command that this man should receive money. In like manner the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to this opinion the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also cause grace.
We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: "He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be [Vulgate: 'you may be made'] partakers of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): "All these things," viz. pertaining to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," viz. of God, "which works by them, remains ever." Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written (Titus 3:5): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."4
Knowledge of God, and, more specifically, living out the sacramental life in the Catholic Church, is necessary to have access to the fullness of the truth. Universal, intellectual, and propositional, truth requires a particular lived experience: the sacramental life of the Catholic Church. Someone who does not frequently confess, and commune, cannot access the truth in the same capacity as someone who does. Nature and practice are at discord with each other. Truth’s nature demands its accessibility to all, regardless of particulars, as veracity of propositional language is independent of particulars. Yet, for Thomas, the sacramental life of the Church, which involves particular persons doing particular things, is necessary to access the fullness of truth. There are ways to reconcile this simultaneous universality and particularity, but the fact that a reconciliation needs to happen is evidence of discordance.
Editor’s note: To make this chapter substack friendly, it will be broken into installments. The next installment will be on Locke and Kant’s modification of the correspondence theory, followed by the insights of Jacque Derrida and Alasdair MacIntyre as to why the correspondence theory breaks down.
Aquinas, Thomas. Edited by Anton C. Pegis. Basic Writings: Volume One. Hacket publishing. Indianaoplis, Indiana. 1997. Q16, Art2
Thomas, Aquinas. Basic Writings. Q12 A2
“Question 111. the Division of Grace.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The division of grace (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 111). Accessed December 17, 2023. https://www.newadvent.org/summa/2111.htm#article1.
“Question 62. the Sacraments’ Principal Effect, Which Is Grace.” SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The sacraments’ principal effect, which is grace (Tertia Pars, Q. 62). Accessed December 17, 2023. https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4062.htm.