Introduction
Recently substack has seen some discussion on vitalism, whose essence can be encapsulated by the following quote:
"The falseness of an opinion," said Nietzsche, "is not for us any objection to it.... The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving...." When such pragmatism begins, Nihilism passes into the Vitalist stage, which may be defined as the elimination of truth as the criterion of human action, and the substitution of a new standard: the "life-giving," the "vital"; it is the final divorce of life from truth…”1
Loosely connected with Machiavellianism, as well as the thought of both Carl Schmitt and Ernst Junger, vitalism is taken by many on the right as an alternative to Christianity. While I have taken some shots at vitalism, and have historically made the case for the classical Christian view, I have never put out a criticism of vitalism. As I do more research for my upcoming book, I thought I would post an essay from my undergraduate days critiquing vitalism through the lens of Wuthering Heights.
The Essay
For most of Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff is able to exert his will over all those around him on account of his physical strength and lack of pity. Although Heathcliff does not get his way in the end, he nevertheless is able to go about unchallenged for almost the entire novel. It was not only Heathcliff’s physical strength that allowed him to exert his will, a physically strong man may respect the other’s will, but his disregard for the other and his lack of pity enabled him to dominate those around him. This lack of pity enabled Heathcliff to use his physical prowess unimpeded by any moralistic concerns. On account of his physical strength, his lack of pity and his exertion of will, it would not be inappropriate to describe Heathcliff as Nietzschean. If we are not Nietzscheans and if we object to Heathcliff’s conduct, what criticism can we offer that does not, in the Nietzschean tradition, reduce to a detestation of the strong and an elevation of the weak? One possible criticism, the one that shall be considered here, is that Heathcliff’s conduct does not demonstrate strength but, rather, demonstrates weakness. It is only such a critique, I posit, that does not lay susceptible to the typical accusation of “slave morality.”
Before offering a moral criticism of Heathcliff’s conduct, it is necessary to specify what conduct of Heathcliff’s is being objected to. In general, the conduct being objected to here involves either a) physical violence and/or b) manipulation. Examples would include Heathcliff marrying Isabella to harm Linton and Catherine[1], locking Isabella in her room so that she will not leave him[2], hanging Isabella’s dog out of spite[3], taking away the young Linton by force[4], beating the younger Catherine for questing him[5], and breaking down a side out of the older Catherine’s casket so that, when he is buried, his body may fuse with hers and, thereby, making impossible for Linton to tell which body is which.[6] When Heathcliff wants something, he is going to get it no matter who gets hurt or how badly they get hurt. The conduct being spoken of here is pitiless violence and manipulation in service of the will to power.
How do we begin to criticize Heathcliff’s conduct? Under what framework can the cruelty portrayed in Wuthering Heights, be understood? Thomas Aquinas gives an account of ethics that might be helpful here.[7] Aquinas teaches us that,
“good and evil are not constitutive differences except in moral matters, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will…and because good has the nature of an end, for this reason good and evil are specific differences in moral matters—the good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end.”[8]
According to Thomas, moral evil exists when a will wills an undue (improper/disordered) end. When Heathcliff desired to marry Isabella, what was wrong was not his desire for Isabelle or marriage but the end of that desire—expanding his property and hurting Linton.[9] When Heathcliff hung Isabella’s dog, what was wrong was not that he hung a dog or desired to hang a dog (someone might hang a very sick dog to put it out of its misery), but that the end of his desire, to hurt Isabella, was improper.[10] What is objectionable in Heathcliff is not that he wills certain things and acts accordingly, but that his will is disordered. It is not Heathcliff’s power nor his will that is objectionable, it is what he does with it. From the Thomistic perspective, the Nietzschean reduction of morality to the justification of the weak is evaded, as it is not that Heathcliff wills, nor that he achieves what he wills, but what he wills that is problematic. If what is willed is good, then the satisfaction of the will is to be praised.
While Thomas provides a framework in which we may object to Heathcliff’s actions, and while in the self-understanding of a Thomist, the Nietzschean reduction is avoided, this framework is not one that Heathcliff or a Nietzschean would accept. A Nietzschean will likely look upon Thomistic ethics and understand the idea of a properly ordered will as an invention of the weak to chastise the strong. Those who take Heathcliff’s will to disordered, says the Nietzschean, are upset that they cannot, like Heathcliff, fulfill their will and thus all talk of a “properly ordered will” is a mere justification of their weakness. If we want to object to Heathcliff’s actions, and if we want to provide an objection that escapes the Nietzschean response, something in addition to Aquinas is needed.
An objection to Heathcliff’s conduct that would be heard by a Nietzschean must, in the end, reduce to “Heathcliff’s conduct, while appearing to demonstrate strength, actually demonstrates his weakness.” Analyzing Heathcliff from a Thomistic perspective enables us to say that Heathcliff wills improperly, but it does not enable us to say that he is weak. What does enable us to say this is if we add Boethius’ analysis of evil to Thomas’. Boethius says the following regarding evil and power:
“If a man by walking could reach a point beyond which there was nowhere for him to go, you would consider him a champion of walking. In the same way you must judge the man who achieves the goal of all endeavor, beyond which there is nothing, to be supreme in power. The opposite of this is also true; those who do not gain it are obviously lacking in power.”[11]
To gain any given good requires the corresponding degree of power necessary to gain said good, whereas those who do not gain a given good are lacking in the corresponding degree of power to gain said good. Thomas Aquinas teaches that moral evil consists in willing a good in the absence of a good end, and Boethius argues that when a person wills a good in the absence of a good end then that said person is lacking in power. The weakness here may either be in the will, X cannot bring himself to will Y, or in the ability to actualize the will, X wills Y but is too weak to gain Y.
The two following propositions illustrate Boethius’ argument:
I) It is a good thing to be married, but it is a better thing to be married to someone who loves you.
II) It is a good thing for your spouse stay married to you, but it is better thing for your spouse to stay married to you in the absence of physical threats.
By seducing Isabella, Heathcliff demonstrated that he had the power to gain the good of marriage, but not the good of a loving marriage.[12] By locking Isabella in his house, Heathcliff demonstrated that he had the power to gain the good of his spouse not leaving him (although she eventually does), but not the power to gain the good of his spouse staying married to him in the absence of violent threats.[13] Heathcliff’s conduct is morally objectionable because he wills good things improperly, and the reason Heathcliff wills things improperly is because he either a) lacks the will to will things properly or b) he lacks the power to gain goods willed in their proper way. If Heathcliff was strong, if he possessed real power, then he would have the ability to have the goods he desires, namely a marriage to someone who loves him back, and a wife who would stay with him out of devotion, and not because she is threatened.
Recapitulation
In Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff, through pitiless manipulation and physical violence, is able to get almost anything he wants. Anticipating Fredrich Nietzsche, Bronte imaginatively portrays the will to power. If we, the readers of Wuthering Heights, object to Heathcliff’s will to power, we might want to offer a moral criticism of his conduct. We might also want to offer a moral criticism that could not easily be dismissed as mere contempt for the strong, for this would seem to be Heathcliff’s response to any moral criticism. The criticism presented here is a synthesis of Thomistic ethics with Boethius’ statements about evil and power in his The Consolation of Philosophy. Thomas argues that moral evil consists of willing a good in the absence of a good end, of willing a good thing in an improper way. Neither Heathcliff’s will nor strength are the objects of moral criticism, for if we accept Thomas’ picture, it is the objects of moral criticism are the ends towards which he willed. Boethius explains that the reason why a person wills a good improperly is said person’s lack of strength. Heathcliff, therefore, is not demonstrating his strength when he forcefully takes the younger Linton, for example, but rather is demonstrating his weakness. A moral criticism that can be raised against Heathcliff, without falling into the Nietzschean reduction of morality to the justification of the weak, therefore, is that Heathcliff himself is weak, and that his powerlessness to achieve good ends, evidenced by his behavior, is contemptible.
Application
A brief thought can be added here. In an age where masculinity is under attack, and when those tasked with protecting our country are demonstrably weak, decadent, and care more about money than honor, justice, or patriotism, the lure of vitalism is not unwarranted. It is initially liberating to hear the message of “the will to power”, “it is better to be feared than loved”, and to daydream about sending in the shock troops irrespective of ethics. One vice, however, does not justify the opposite and corresponding vice. Fleeing cowardice, and embracing brashness, for example, is a miscalculation based upon an emotional reaction. If vitalism is to be seriously considered, then serious questions must be asked. First, is Heathcliff happy? Do we want a society of Heathcliffs? If the answer is no, then the question is why? Trying to put boundaries on the will (Heathcliff should not have been brutal to his family, but he could have been to an invading force, perhaps) is still, however worded, an attempt to limit the will, and is liable to be criticized as slave morality (you do not like what Heathcliff did to his family because you would not like someone to do that to you, and someone could do that to you because you are weak, and thus you need a “moral” principle to protect yourself). Or you could try and establish a set of moral principles independent of the will, but this would be taking you off the reservation as it were.
Staying consistent with the desire to a) affirm strength, and b) not limit the will, what criticism can be made is the one I did in the above essay: the will, so long as it wills what is good, should be unimpeded. If you will good things, such as a loving marriage, or justice, then that will should be freed to act upon those good ends. There needs to be a definition of what good ends are, which is a separate task than the one set out here, but it should suffice to say that reading the Bible, aided with the interpretation of the great luminaries, like Saint John Chrysostom, Saint Basil, Saint Gregory the Theologian, Saint Ambrose of Milan, and Saint Augustine, will bear out a pretty clear picture.
Vitalism is to Christianity what Andrew Tate is to Dave Ramsey. One is a flashy reaction to decadence and weakness, while the other, though humbler, will help you live well.
[1] Bronte, Emily. Wuthering Heights. United States: Planet E-Book. 141
[2] Bronte. Wuthering Heights. United States: Planet E-Book. 191
[3] Bronte. Wuthering Heights. 165
[4] Bronte. 258
[5] Bronte. 343
[6] Ibid. 164-166
[7] How well Aquinas helps us understand Heathcliff will depend upon the depth, breadth and simplicity of the Thomistic explanation in comparison to other ethical traditions—a task that is beyond the scope of this paper.
[8] Summa 1. Q 48. Art 1. Reply Obj 2.
[9] Bronte. 193-194
[10] Bronte. 165
[11] Boethius, Ancius. The Consolation of Philosophy. London: Penguin, 2003. 90
[12] Bronte. 193-194
[13] Bronte. 191
Rose, Eugene. Nihilism: The Root of the Modern Revolution. St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood. Platina, California. 2018. 50
I agree with the general argument of your essay--reaction versus authentic willing--and hear echoes of Julius Evola therein. I am unsure what value you see in Christianity; or rather, I would ask you to specify what 'sort' of Christianity you are referring to. I am a Traditionalist also, but from Evola, so I find Christianity instills weakness and submission (I observed this especially in women who will suffer every unimaginable horror or misery out of some misplaced understanding of 'God's will').
The problem is that Nietzsche is not a systematic or conceptual thinker. His work is aesthetic, mythical, poetic, and is to be absorbed as a spirit of 'ethos'. Unlike Kant, Hegel, and even Heidegger, you can't extract concepts from Nietzsche and singularly critique them. There is no 'categorical imperative' or 'Dasein' or 'dialectic'...Nietzsche is a force, a 'Zeitgeist'. This is why I seldom discuss his work with professional academics, because their 'academic' study of his writings is contrary to their nature.
Anyway, I do appreciate you newsletter although I may not agree with many important topics featured therein.